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I. INTRODUCTION
Although arbitration clauses in attorney–client retainer agreements are
enforceable,1 courts across the country continuously struggle with the
1. Watts v. Polaczyk, 619 N.W.2d 714, 717–18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding an arbitration
clause enforceable in a retainer agreement when the attorney advised the client in writing to obtain
independent counsel before signing the agreement); Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 148
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undecided question of whether the attorney is required to fully apprise the
client of the legal consequences of such a clause.2 State courts take various
viewpoints on the issue, and most stand contrary to the position of the
American Bar Association and state ethics committee opinions on the
subject.3 Consequently, attorneys must disclose truthful and accurate
information regarding arbitration agreements when engaged in multijurisdictional practice in order to ensure their protection from malpractice
liability.4
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently stretched this requirement to
place a heavy burden on the attorney in Hodges v. Reasonover.5 The court
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“[A]rbitration agreements are enforceable in the
context of a legal malpractice suit.”). But see In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2000, no pet.) (striking down an arbitration clause in an attorney–client contract because it
referenced both federal and state arbitration laws).
2. See Desert Outdoor Adver. v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 163–65 (Ct. App.
2011) (concluding the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement was “readily discernible and clear”
therefore, further disclosure by the attorney was not required). Compare Hodges v. Reasonover, 103
So. 3d 1069, 1078 (La. 2012) (requiring attorneys to fully disclose the scope, terms, and legal
consequences of the arbitration clause), with Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier,
67 So. 3d 315, 318–19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating there is no legal authority that either
prohibits arbitration clauses in retainer agreements or mandates what level of disclosure about the
consequences is desirable), and Haynes v. Kuder, 591 A.2d 1286, 1290–91 (D.C. 1991) (“Although
in deciding this issue we touch on substantial ethical concerns, and the written agreement was
somewhat terse in explaining the rights [the client] would relinquish by agreeing to arbitration, we
agree with the trial judge that the written disclosure was sufficient to negate the claim of fraudulent
inducement as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
3. Compare Haynes, 591 A.2d at 1290–92 (providing although the language of the arbitration
clause did not expressly describe the waiver to a jury trial, the client was reasonably informed of the
clause’s application), with ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(opining clients must receive information about the possible benefits and consequences of arbitration
to enable them to make an informed decision about the provision), and Tex. Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (agreeing the lawyer should inform the client about the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration, but only “to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary”). The
District of Columbia Legal Ethics Committee originally encouraged greater disclosure about the
ramifications of arbitration, but subsequently revised its opinion; it concluded that a separate attorney
must counsel the client regarding arbitration. D.C. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990)
(“Therefore, we now conclude that Opinion 190 was incorrect in supposing that adequate disclosures
concerning mandatory arbitration could be made to lay clients. Accordingly, mandatory arbitration
agreements covering all disputes between lawyer and client are not permitted under either our prior
Opinions or Rule 1.8(a) unless the client is in fact counseled by another attorney.”).
4. See generally Louis A. Russo, Note, The Consequences of Arbitrating a Legal Malpractice
Claim: Rebuilding Faith in the Legal Profession, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 327, 344–60 (categorizing
states’ handling of malpractice arbitration into two groups: those that require the client to consult
with independent counsel, and those that require the attorney to disclose the consequences of
arbitration to the client).
5. Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069 (La. 2012); see also State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op.
94-05 (1994) (opining the attorney should disclose the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration in
the agreement, but not listing them specifically).
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balanced two integral policies: the favorability of the enforcement of
arbitration clauses in contract law against the fiduciary duties an attorney
owes his client.6 The court not only mandated the attorney’s disclosure of
the arbitration clause, but also listed a minimum number of legal
consequences stemming from the arbitration clause that the client must be
aware of before signing the retainer agreement.7 The concurring and
dissenting opinions offered special insight into the potential problems with
the majority’s ruling.8 While the standard dictated by the majority
opinion far exceeds those found in other jurisdictions, an attorney can
curtail legal malpractice claims by including the legal benefits and
consequences of arbitration in the retainer agreement. The extent of the
fiduciary duties owed by the attorney to a prospective client, however,
remains an open question.9
Part II of this Case Summary will walk through the facts of the case and
analyze the majority, concurrence, and dissenting opinions. Part III will
explore and balance the pros and cons of arbitration, and Part IV will
analyze the relevant Model Rules applicable to fee agreements. Finally,
Part V will offer advice to attorneys counseling clients about the
ramifications of arbitration clauses in fee retainer agreements.
II. CASE SUMMARY
The facts of Hodges are straightforward: the Hodges originally retained
the Reasonover & Olinde law firm to sue MedAssets in federal court.10
The Hodges signed a retainer agreement containing an arbitration
clause.11 Two years into the dispute, the Hodges requested the fee
arrangement in the retainer be changed from a blended fee schedule to a
pure contingency fee.12 The revised agreement contained the same
arbitration clause as the original, and the attorneys advised the Hodges to

6. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1072–73.
7. Id. at 1077.
8. See generally id. at 1079–83 (providing two concurring opinions and a dissenting opinion).
9. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (specifying that Texas Disciplinary
Rule 1.03(b), which requires a lawyer to reasonably explain matters affecting representation to their
client, applies only when a prospective client signs a retainer agreement with an arbitration clause).
The Committee also distinguished between clients that have differing levels of experience and
sophistication. Id.; accord ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(“Depending on the sophistication of the client[,] . . . the lawyer should explain the possible adverse
consequences as well as the benefits arising from execution of the agreement.”).
10. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1071.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1072.
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seek independent counsel before signing the agreement.13 The claims
against MedAssets proved unsuccessful, and the Hodges sued the firm for
legal malpractice.14 Both the district court and the appellate court ruled
against enforcing the arbitration clause, labeling it a “prospective limitation
of liability.”15
A. The Majority’s Balancing Act
In the court’s reasoning, the Louisiana Supreme Court first outlined the
commonly held principle that public policy favors arbitration.16 Although
an issue of first impression in Louisiana, the court recognized the American
Bar Association Ethics Committee, along with various state bar ethics
committees, enforce agreed-upon arbitration clauses in attorney–client
retainer agreements.17 The Hodges conceded the arbitration clause did
not prospectively limit the attorney’s liability, but argued that mandatory
arbitration imposed “unreasonable procedural barriers” on clients.18
Particularly, the Hodges contended that the upfront cost of arbitration
simultaneously deters litigants from entering the arbitration stage and
shields the attorney from malpractice claims.19 The court dismissed this
argument by underlining the option for a waiver of the initial filing fee
from the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and noting the balance
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2002) (acknowledging the
federal policy of favoring arbitration clauses, but expressing skepticism at the inclusion of such clauses
in adhesion contracts). See generally Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475–76 (1989) (declaring ambiguities in arbitration clauses should be viewed in
the clause’s favor); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act as “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements”). The Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law on the
subject. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Lane Indus., Inc., 201 S.E.2d 452, 453 (Ga. 1973)
(“Where such a transaction involves commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration
Statute, the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal law.” (citing
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Airport, 269 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1959))).
17. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1072; ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op.
02425 (2002); State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-257 (1996).
The public policy favoring arbitration clauses stems from the “duty to read” maxim of contract law.
See generally Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 275 (1990) (“The typical doctrinal shorthand for this
view is that the buyer has a ‘duty to read’ the contract; if she neglects this duty she waives her
objection to the consequences.”).
18. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1074.
19. Id. at 1074–75.
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between the upfront cost and the efficiency of arbitration.20 The court
further stated that an arbitration clause generally does not limit the
substantive rights of either party; rather, the arbitration clause is best
viewed as an alternative method of dispute resolution.21 Thus, the court
concluded, these clauses do not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct
and are enforceable.22
In their second argument before the court, the Hodges asserted their
attorney did not sufficiently disclose the full extent of the legal
consequences that accompanied the arbitration clause and maintained that
the clause was unenforceable.23 In response to this argument, the court
completely changed its focus from the clause’s enforceability to the
fiduciary duties owed to a prospective client by an attorney.24
“‘The relation of attorney and client is more than a contract. It
superinduces a trust status of the highest order and devolves upon the
attorney the imperative duty of dealing with the client on the basis of
strictest fidelity and honor.’”25 As a result, retainer agreements between
attorneys and their clients are traditionally interpreted with strict scrutiny
to correspond with the attorney’s fiduciary duties.26
The court started by exploring the fiduciary duties of candor and
loyalty.27 Drawing from the definition and rules governing informed
consent,28 the court reasoned that the client may only make an informed
20. Id. The court specifically pointed to AAA’s waiver of initial filing fees for those 200%
below the poverty line, and emphasized that arbitration “streamline[s] discovery,” saving both time
and money. Id. at 1075.
21. Id. at 1076.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1077.
25. Id. at 1073 (quoting Teague v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 1266, 1271
(La. 2008)). The trend of bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim is on the rise, but the actual
phrase still lacks a precise definition. See Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of
Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
135, 141–46 (2008) (explaining a breach of fiduciary duty may involve a breach of multiple duties
because of the lack of a strict definition).
26. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1073 (“At the same time, agreements between law firms and clients
are held to higher scrutiny than normal commercial contracts because of the fiduciary duties
involved.”); Jean Fleming Powers, Ethical Implications of Attorneys Requiring Clients to Submit
Malpractice Claims to ADR, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 646 (1997).
27. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077.
28. Id. According to Rule 1.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer must
explain the legal effects of any decision related to the client’s representation “to the extent reasonably
necessary.” ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
53 (7th ed. 2011) (emphasis added). This language has been interpreted to include arbitration
agreements in attorney–client retainer agreements. Id. at 63 (citing Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics,
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decision about the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the retainer
agreement if the significant legal consequences are fully explained to the
client.29 Reversing its earlier assessment, the court leaned on the longstanding Louisiana tradition that attorneys should inform their clients of
consequences associated with contracts that “negatively affect the client’s
rights.”30 Attorneys, the court reasoned, hold an unfair advantage over
their clients who do not understand the inner workings of the legal
system.31 The court then mandated that when entering a retainer
agreement with a client, the attorney must inform the client of: the waiver
of a jury trial, the waiver of appeal, the waiver of broad discovery, the
upfront costs of arbitration, the claims covered by the clause, the client’s
continued right to report the attorney to the state disciplinary committee,
and the client’s right to seek separate counsel about the clause.32 The
court thus concluded the attorneys in Hodges failed to meet the disclosure
requirements and invalidated the arbitration clause.33 Though this
seemed to be a victory for the clients, the decision carries broad
implications for current industry practice.34
B. The Concurrence’s Preemptive Timing Trap
Justice Weimer’s concurrence generally agreed with the majority’s view
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, but disagreed with the level
of disclosure required of the attorney.35 Specifically, he points to a
“potential [preemptive] trap” that could affect a client’s malpractice
claim.36 Louisiana law dictates a one-year uninterrupted time limit on
Op. No. 586 (2008)).
29. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077 (“Inherent in these duties is the principle that an attorney
cannot take any action adversely affecting the client’s interest unless the client has been fully apprised,
to the extent reasonably practicable, of the risks and possible consequences thereof—that is, the client
must give informed consent.”).
30. Id. But see id. at 1074 (stating arbitration clauses do not substantially affect the rights of
either party).
31. Id. at 1077.
32. Id. at 1077.
33. Id. at 1078. The court further held the attorney’s duty does not depend on the client’s
sophistication. Id. But see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(striking a compromise between the lawyer’s expertise and the client’s sophistication by
recommending the attorney explain the legal ramifications “to the extent necessary,” with the caveat
that a mandatory arbitration clause is only allowed when accompanied by full disclosure of the legal
consequences).
34. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1079 (Victory, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s expansion of
disclosure duties owed by an attorney).
35. Id. at 1080 (Weimer, J., concurring).
36. Id.
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legal malpractice claims; therefore, if arbitration is not concluded within
one year of the alleged malpractice, it is arguable that the client’s claim will
be barred.37 Viewed in this light, no arbitration clause treats these claims
fairly.38 States have various statutes of limitation periods on legal
malpractice claims, but this argument potentially applies to all jurisdictions
because of the lengthy nature of arbitration.39 There is a valid argument
based on public policy that clients should be informed of this timing trap
prior to signing a retainer agreement containing an arbitration clause.
C. The Dissent’s Independent Counsel Option
Justice Victory relied upon the fundamentals of contract law in his
dissenting opinion.40 Victory concluded the arbitration clause in the
retainer agreement contained plain, unambiguous language; therefore, it
was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act and local Louisiana
law.41 The Hodges testified the attorney advised them to consult with
independent counsel before agreeing to the arbitration clause.42 Though
Justice Victory acknowledged the importance of the attorney–client
relationship,43 he emphasized the purpose of advising clients to consult
with independent counsel: to provide the client with the option of
reviewing the legal ramifications of arbitration with a neutral attorney.44
Therefore, under the dissent’s analysis, Mr. Reasonover performed
everything legally required of him.45 However, this argument relies on the
assumption that the mere offer of independent counsel would cause a

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1082. Justice Weimer also defers this issue to the legislature, stating: “If the
legislature wishes to allow the initiation of an arbitration to be the functional equivalent of filing a
lawsuit[,] . . . the legislature could amend the law.” Id. at 1083.
39. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 2010) (fixing a one-year time period on
legal malpractice claims); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.3 (1956) (setting a three-year statute of
limitations on legal malpractice claims); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West
Supp. 2012) (establishing a two-year limit on malpractice actions).
40. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1079–80 (Victory, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1080. The clause itself specifically designated that it covered any dispute. Id.
42. Id. at 1079.
43. Id. at 1080. The attorney–client relationship is fiduciary; it arises out of the client’s
complete reliance and trust in the attorney. Courts generally hold agreements between attorneys and
their clients to a higher standard because of this special relationship and the unequal bargaining
power of the parties. See generally Matthew J. Clark, Note, The Legal and Ethical Implications of PreDispute Agreements Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 IOWA L. REV. 827,
844–45 (1999) (describing the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship and applying it to
arbitration disputes).
44. Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1080 (Victory, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
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reasonable person to infer that arbitration carries adverse legal
implications.
III. THE UNSPOKEN BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION
As with any legal action, arbitration carries potential benefits and
consequences.46 The Hodges opinion lists the potential consequences in
explicit detail, but makes no mention of the possible benefits of
arbitration. Even if not required to do so, it would make sense for
attorneys to inform their clients of the possible advantages of arbitration.
For the legal system as a whole, arbitration provides an alternative way to
resolve disputes, thus removing cases from clogged courts.47 For the
client, the legal consequences accompanying arbitration may also be
potentially beneficial.48 For example, there are corollary advantages to
waiving the right to a jury trial; arbitration provides one qualified decisionmaker, and hearings take less time because there is no need to manage a
jury.49 Though there are upfront costs to arbitration, evidentiary and
procedural complications are non-existent because arbitration hearings are
informal, thus making the overall cost of arbitration much less than
malpractice litigation.50 The shorter time span and confidential nature of
arbitration proceedings also maintain more privacy than public litigation
proceedings.51
Just as there are pros and cons for the client to consider, the attorney

46. See generally Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 204–10 (1996) (exploring the benefits and perceived drawbacks of
arbitration).
47. Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1672
(1996) (considering the benefits of arbitration).
48. Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate Guidelines for
Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1219 (2002) (identifying elements of arbitration that
may be appealing to clients).
49. Thomas B. Metzoff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 203, 208 (1996). Though Metzoff’s article mainly focuses on medical malpractice litigation,
the principles are directly applicable to the realm of legal malpractice. Id.
50. See id. (explaining arbitration hearings reduce costs because “there is no need to select,
instruct, or manage a jury” and “conflicts over evidentiary issues are minimized because arbitration
hearings are typically less formal than a jury trial”).
51. Id. at 209. Metzoff also explores the use of experts in arbitration proceedings, concluding
the use of neutral experts in arbitration hearings is preferable over the “expert fights” one encounters
in malpractice litigation. Id. at 209–10. But see Bruce A. Rubin & Jennifer J. Roof, A Contrarian’s
Checklist to Arbitration Clauses, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 242, 242–46 (2007) (counter-arguing that
arbitrators, who are often retired judges or lawyers, charge by the hour, could potentially stretch the
arbitration process over a longer time span than litigation, and that the confidentiality of arbitration
is only temporary in nature).
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must also weigh the benefits and consequences of arbitration.52 Many
attorneys are reluctant to include arbitration clauses in their retainer
agreements because of the finality of the proceedings and the potential
embarrassment of subjecting their administrative practices to the
arbitrator’s scrutiny.53 The attorney must weigh these negative attributes
of arbitration against the negative aspects of malpractice litigation.54
These consequences include harm to the attorney’s reputation and the cost
of the litigation process.55 Like most choices in the legal profession,
neither choice is legally wrong; the attorney must simply determine
whether to include an arbitration clause in retainer agreements with his
clients.
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND DISCLOSURE: FACTORS TO CONSIDER
A. Rule 1.8: Prospective Limitation of Liability56
The debate concerning arbitration clauses in attorney–client retainer
agreements originally centered on Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.8(h)(1), which states, “A lawyer shall not . . . make an agreement
prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the
client is independently represented in making the agreement.”57 The
ABA and the courts eventually concluded arbitration agreements do not
violate this rule.58 Comment 14 to Rule 1.8 explicitly states that “[t]his
paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an
agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided
52. See generally Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2002) (summarizing concerns
attorneys should ponder before choosing to include an arbitration clause in their retainer
agreements).
53. Id. at 1218.
54. In general, arbitration is more efficient, informal, and private; litigation is generally more
thorough and final. Id. at 1217–18.
55. Id.
56. See E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 133–34 (6th ed. 2007) (listing the provisions of Rule 1.8—specific rules regarding
conflicts of interest with current clients); see also Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (explaining the parallel rule in the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct and holding that “the arbitration clause in the instant case does not
limit the liability to which appellees would otherwise be exposed, and therefore it does not violate
[the Texas Disciplinary Rules]”).
57. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
134 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 138 cmt. 15 (“Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not
prohibited by this Rule.”).
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such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the
scope and effect of the agreement.”59 After overcoming the enforceability
obstacle, attorneys wishing to include arbitration clauses in retainer
agreements encountered another problem: to what degree should the client
be apprised of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration?
The dispute over this question shifted the focus in the Model Rules.
The duty of loyalty requires lawyers to screen for potential conflicts of
interest among current and former clients.60 This duty of loyalty also
encompasses the confidentiality obligation between lawyers and clients.61
However, in some instances, the duty of loyalty differs for prospective
clients from current and former clients; for example, a lawyer will only be
barred from representing a client with an adverse interest to a former
potential client if the former potential client revealed information “that
could be significantly harmful to him.”62 This treatment suggests certain
duties to prospective clients are diminished when other rights or factors are
at play.63 Therefore, whether a client is current or prospective could
potentially determine the level of required disclosure and the legal
consequences of a binding arbitration clause in the attorney’s retainer
agreement.
B. Rule 1.4: Communication64
Communication is paramount to the overall quality of the attorney–
client relationship.65 Rule 1.4 governs communication in the client–

59. Id. at 138 cmt. 14. Comment 15 expands upon this statement by requiring a lawyer to
inform the client in writing of their option to consult independent counsel. Id. at 138 cmt. 15.
60. Id. at 160–61 (discussing how to determine if the client should be categorized as a “former”
client).
61. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
280 (7th ed. 2011) (emphasizing the scope of the confidentiality obligation: it does not end because a
prospective client did not retain the lawyer for representation).
62. Id. at 281. A similar Rule applies to short-term legal service attorneys. Id. at 165, 529–31
(eliminating the attorney’s obligation to check for conflicts of interest when rendering limited legal
services).
63. See id. at 280 (“Although a lawyer may neither use nor reveal information relating to the
representation of a current client, she may use information relating to the representation of a former
client once it is generally known.”).
64. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
53 (6th ed. 2007).
65. Ursula H. Weigold, The Attorney–Client Privilege As an Obstacle to the Professional and
Ethical Development of Law Students, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 677, 681–82 (2006) (characterizing
communication as a “necessary lawyering skill” and describing numerous situations where successful
lawyers must be capable of effective communication).
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lawyer relationship.66 Specifically, subsection (b) states, “A lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”67 Thus, it makes
logical sense that the decision of whether to agree to a retainer agreement is
a decision regarding the representation. However, Comment 5 seemingly
narrows the scope of part (b).68 It also further clarifies the issue by stating
that the “[a]dequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of
advice or assistance that is involved.”69 The comment expands on
communication involving the objective of representation, but not on
preliminary or initial agreements concerning the attorney–client
relationship.70 The annotated version of the rules, however, includes a
broad discussion about communicating adverse consequences and refers to
mandatory arbitration clauses in retainer agreements.71 Though the ABA
Model Rules do not carry the force of law, they are controlling and
enforceable in jurisdictions that adopt the Model Rules.72
C. Rule 1.5: Fees73
In a comment to Rule 1.5 that relates to fees, the ABA gives each state
bar the ultimate power to regulate the disclosure procedure in arbitration
disputes regarding fees.74 Therefore, the guidance in the Model Rules is
66. Id. at 681–83.
67. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
53 (6th ed. 2007).
68. Id. at 54.
69. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 54
cmt. 5 (7th ed. 2011).
70. Id.
71. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
63 (6th ed. 2007) (“Accordingly, a lawyer must explain the legal effect of entering an agreement or
executing a legal document.”). While this seems to contradict the scope of Comment 5, Rule 1.4(b)
on its face is broad enough in its language to encompass all interactions and decisions between
attorney and client.
72. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 298 (1992)
(“Although the profession initially formulates ethics rules in an attempt at self-regulation, it is the
courts that, as external governors of the profession, must give ethics rules the force of law in
disciplinary proceedings. Likewise, courts must decide whether and to what extent ethics rules have
authoritative force in other contexts.”).
73. E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
65 (6th ed. 2007).
74. “If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or
mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is
mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to
it.” E. NORMAN VEASEY ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 68
cmt. 9 (6th ed. 2007).
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not mandatory.
D. ABA and State Ethics Committees
ABA and state ethics committee opinions attempt to untangle the
arbitration problem, but often only contribute to the confusion. In a 2002
formal opinion, the ABA expressed concern about clients’ ability to
appreciate the consequences of arbitration.75 The ABA opined that clients
must be sufficiently informed to be able to make a proper decision about
whether to submit to a mandatory binding arbitration clause in a fee
retainer.76 The ABA derived this conclusion from Rules 1.4(b) and 1.7,
combining the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to explain properly legal
ramifications involved in a client’s representation and the lawyer’s duty to
resolve conflicts of interest with the client’s informed consent to create an
ethically permissible technique for including arbitration clauses in retainer
agreements.77
It is ethically permissible to include in a retainer agreement with a client a
provision that requires the binding arbitration of fee disputes and
malpractice claims provided that (1) the client has been fully apprised of the
advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and has been given sufficient
information to permit her to make an informed decision about whether to
agree to the inclusion of the arbitration provision in the retainer agreement,
and (2) the arbitration provision does not insulate the lawyer from liability
or limit the liability to which she would otherwise be exposed under
common [or] statutory law.78

In contrast to the ABA’s fullest disclosure stance, the District of
Columbia Bar issued an opinion retracting its previous position on the
75. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002).
76. Id. See also Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney–Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1219–22 (2002) (analyzing the various
concerns clients have when deciding on an arbitration clause).
77. The Opinion further postulates an arbitration clause mandatory in nature represents a
conflict of interest “that can be neutralized only by the lawyer providing full disclosure and an
explanation sufficient ‘to permit the client to make an informed decision’ about whether to agree to a
binding arbitration provision.” ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425
(2002); accord N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, Ethics Op. 723 (1997) (“[A] lawyer may ethically include
a condition in a retainer agreement requiring that all disputes . . . be subject to arbitration . . .
provided that the lawyer fully discloses the consequences of that condition to the client and allows the
client the opportunity, should the client so choose, to seek independent counsel regarding the
provision.”).
78. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) (emphasis added).
The opinion also clarifies the prior opinions regarding Rule 1.4(b) construed the Rule as relating to
the matter of representation, but Opinion 02-425 extends Rule 1.4(b) to the attorney–client
relationship. Id. at n.13.
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matter.79 D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 190 expressed the need for full
disclosure of the legal consequences of arbitration clauses in retainer
agreements with clients.80 Subsequently, in Opinion 211, the D.C. Bar
completely reversed its position, stating, “Opinion 190 was incorrect in its
belief that the complex nature of arbitration could be adequately disclosed
to a lay client.”81 Therefore, the D.C. Bar concluded that full disclosure is
an unrealistic expectation because of the flexible nature of the arbitration
procedure and the many factors affecting it.82 The Bar removed the
disclosure requirement and instead mandated that the client seek counsel
from an independent attorney before signing the agreement.83 The D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct were subsequently changed a second time in
2007; the amendment removed the requirement for advice from independent counsel under Rule 1.5.84 The District of Columbia made a
complete circle, turning from mandatory full disclosure, to the necessity of
independent counsel, to no requirements at all.
The Texas Professional Ethics Committee issued an opinion that
attempted to find a middle ground between full disclosure and none at
all—the Committee suggested the lawyer should explain the benefits and
consequences of arbitration to the client “to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes is necessary.”85
Additionally, the opinion considers the
sophistication of the client when discerning the level of disclosure required.
For example, the opinion specifies that when the client is a large business
entity, disclosure may not be necessary.86 However, the opinion also
79. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990).
80. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 190 (1988).
81. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990).
82. Id.
83. Id. Two members dissented, arguing an attorney can summarize effectively the legal
consequences and the basic nature of arbitration proceedings. Id. The dissent leans primarily on the
AAA, emphasizing the easy accessibility of information related to arbitration. Id.; see also AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO AAA ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION (2007),
available at https://www.aaau.org/resources/adr-resources (explaining each stage of mediation and
arbitration proceedings).
84. Opinions Substantively Affected by the Amended Rules (Effective 2/1/07), D.C. BAR,
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion_table.cfm (last visited Dec.
28, 2012).
85. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (emphasis added). One year after the
release of this Opinion, a Houston Court of Appeals punted the issue of the enforceability of
arbitration to the legislature. Chambers v. O’Quinn, 305 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“The legislature’s failure to impose such conditions on attorney–client
contracts, while expressly recognizing them in other contexts, indicates that the legislature did not
intend to impose such conditions.”).
86. Id.; see also Desert Outdoor Adver. v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164 (Ct.
App. 2011) (holding an attorney had no duty to separately disclose the arbitration clause and its
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clarified that the Committee did not possess the power necessary to answer
substantive questions about arbitration clauses in attorney–client
agreements.87 While the “reasonably necessary” standard logically entrusts
lawyers with the judgment whether to consult the client about the
arbitration clause, it is difficult to enforce because each case must be
analyzed on its own individual facts.88
VI. PROTECTING AGAINST LIABILITY
Due to the variety of approaches jurisdictions employ when determining
the disclosure of the legal ramifications of arbitration clauses in fee retainer
agreements, the best practice is perhaps the most obvious: explicit
inclusion of the legal consequences of arbitration into the agreement itself.
The attorney can, and should, fully explain the potential benefits of
arbitration to the client. Attorneys engaged in multi-jurisdictional practice
should pay special attention to the required disclosure in each state that
could affect liability.89
Though this issue will undoubtedly continue to surface, attorneys
should always remember to consider their clients first and foremost; proper
practice ensures that the client makes an informed decision on the matter
of binding arbitration clauses.

consequences after analyzing the following factors: the client’s sophistication; the attorney’s
encouragement for the client to seek independent counsel; the client’s corrections to other parts of
the agreement; and a cover letter notating a new retainer agreement and drawing the client’s attention
to new provisions); Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 267–68 (Ct.
App. 1997) (emphasizing the difference between an initial and an existing client’s expectations, and
the effect on the attorney’s fiduciary obligations).
87. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 586 (2008) (“It is beyond the authority of this
Committee to address questions of substantive law relating to the validity of arbitration clauses in
agreements between lawyers and their clients.”).
88. See also Desert Outdoor Adver., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 163 (stating specific factors of each case
affect the fiduciary’s obligations).
89. See Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 67 So. 3d 315, 318–319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“While there are arguably ethical issues that arise in this type of contract, there
is currently no Florida Bar Rule which prohibits this sort of agreement.”); State Bar of Ariz., Ethics
Op. 94-05 (1994) (providing an arbitration clause may be included in an attorney–client fee
agreement if: the clause is reasonable, the clause discloses both the advantages and the disadvantages
of arbitration, the attorney encourages the client to seek independent counsel, and the client consents
in writing); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 170 (1999) (permitting the inclusion of arbitration
clauses in attorney–client fee arrangements); Vt. Advisory Ethics Op. 2003-07 (2003) (allowing
arbitration clauses in fee arrangements if the attorney encourages the client to consult independent
counsel).

